Fly list.). 32 Andrew von Hirsch & Clifford Shearing, Exclusion From Public Space, in Von Hirsh, Garland, and Wakefield, supra note 22, at 77. 33 Dershowitz, supra note 11, at 7 (noting that deterrence requires society to be willing to withstand some level of violations). 34 See Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659, 666 (6th Cir. 1972). 35 passengers 36 Id. 37 See Jerry L. Mashaw, The Struggle for Auto Safety 133 (1990) . 38 See id. at [134] [135] [136] [137] [138] [139] [140] (describing an intense congressional debate weighing the safety benefits of interlock devices against their costs in persist. Today, many states authorize the installation of such systems in the vehicles of people convicted of drunk driving. 39 The systems administer a breathalyzer before the car will start.
The U.S. government has backed a campaign to install such systems in all cars. 40 Digital technology makes situational crime prevention much more feasible. In the vehicle safety context, for example, manufacturers could use digital programming to prevent a wide range of harmful conduct. In new Ford cars, parents can make it impossible for their children to drive faster than a preset maximum speed. 41 It would be easy for the government to impose such limits on all drivers through technology. And preemption is already becoming common in cyberspace, the site of a rapidly increasing share of commercial and recreational activity. Recall pornography filters.
B. Libertarian Paternalism
Situational crime prevention is closely rela as discussed
by Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler in their book, Nudge. 42 Indeed, libertarian paternalism can be described as the non-criminal mirror image of situational crime prevention. As described by Sunstein and Thaler, prevent them from engaging in conduct that is undesirable but not generally illegal. 43 The similarities become clear when 39 See, e.g., Arizona Revised Statutes § 28-1401 (allowing a person convicted of drunk driving to apply for a the n interlock devices in all vehicles owned and routinely operated by a person upon their second conviction for drunk driving). 40 For more detail on this possibility, see infra Section I.C.1. 41 42 Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge (2008) . 43 A further difference is that techniques of situational crime prevention are sometimes more coercive than Sunstein comparing several examples from Nudge with examples from the literature on situational crime prevention.
For example, Sunstein and Thaler note that homeowners could be nudged to conserve energy if thermostats made the price of energy consumption more salient by displaying energy use and costs. 44 Meanwhile, Ronald V. Clarke identifies roadside speedometers as a situational approach to reducing speeding through salience. 45 In truth, digital preemption is less of a revolution than an extension of existing regulatory techniques.
behavior through manipulation of their environment. This is evidenced by numerous examples of situational crime prevention and libertarian paternalism.
People seem comfortable with many of the preemptive techniques discussed in the previous sections. Preemptive approaches to terrorism have gained wide acceptance.
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Similarly, no one has ever complained that criminals should be free to break into buildings so long as they are willing to face the consequences. Instead, we are happy to let landowners and banks work to preempt intrusions. M are relatively uncontroversial as well. 48 Lessig, supra note 21, at 5. 49 See Future, supra note 3, at 107-methods). 50 See James Gordon Meek, Poll: Only 20% of Americans Object to Airport Body Scans by Security Screeners, New York Daily News, Jan 12, 2010 (describing public approval of full body scans to prevent passengers from bringing weapons onto airplanes).
Still, people may react differently to digital preemption for two reasons. First, digital preemption may be more restrictive than other preemptive techniques. Compare roadside speedometers to car engines that stall when a driver exceeds the speed limit. Both prevent But the second would likely provoke significantly greater opposition because it seems to deprive the driver of choice altogether.
Second, digital preemption will often target less severe harms other preemptive enforcement techniques, at least in the near term. For example digital preemption probably will not prevent violent crime anytime soon. Instead, as Zittrain preemption might focus on enforcing copyright and intellectual property laws. 51 In contrast, many non-digital preemptive techniques, including airport security measures, are targeted at the worst kinds of harms. But it would be a failure of imagination to believe digital preemption will never target significant physical and economic crimes. Consider vehicle safety measures, control of digitized firearms, and efforts to prevent financially ruinous cyberattacks.
Ignition interlock technology provides a sketch of how digital preemption might be accepted by the public over time. As noted earlier, in the 1970s, the federal government briefly required cars to come installed with technology that would prevent the engine from starting unless the driver was ensconced in a seatbelt. But the regulation was quickly scrapped, as interlock systems were seen as inconvenient and intrusive.
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Yet, the federal government evidently believes that similar systems to prevent drunk driving may soon be politically feasible. This is likely due in part to the serious harms arising from drunk driving. The government is funding research into such systems, which could be 65 For example, imagine that someone wants to break into a building that has been fortified with very secure locks. A determined thief will use sophisticated or powerful tools to enter the building, steal a key or bribe a security guard. While these methods are available, they require more time and resources than breaking into an unsecured building, and they raise the probability of being caught and punished, another cost. See Katyal, supra note 29, at arget-hardening measures and access controls are employed, only those criminals who have the that burglars are sensi-tive to fences and locks; one reason is that such devices increase the cost of committing a 66 See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 42 choice arc changing their economic incentives).
sufficient technical knowledge, creativity, or resources to circumvent the system. Additionally, digital preemption may serve to eliminate impulsive lawbreaking, because people would have to devote time to finding ways around the preemptive bar.
However, even when digital preemption completely eliminates one kind of illegal behavior, it may not lead to an equivalent net decrease in crime due to displacement.
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Criminologists have vigorously debated the significance of displacement. 68 Those interested in implementing digital preemption should consider the issue further.
3. Digital preemption raises a variety of moral and ethical questions, many of which have been explored previously in criminology literature.
Digital preemption raises difficult moral and ethical questions. These questions are mostly outside the scope of this article, which focuses on the practical impacts of digital preemption. But it is appropriate here to comment briefly on these issues and describe how they have been dealt with in the literature on situational crime prevention.
Criminologists have considered whether preemptive enforcement might lead to a society poorer in public morality, openness, or trust, 69 and these concerns seem firmly applicable to digital preemption. One common line of analysis starts by arguing that, by anticipating unlawful behavior, preemptive enforcement sends a message that criminal impulses are expected. Another concern is that the benefits and burdens of preemption will be distributed unfairly across people and communities. 73 The most troubling version of this concern holds that preemption will disproportionately benefit the wealthy and burden others. organizations may employ digital preemption on their own initiative, just as private parties use locks to prevent property theft. This possibility is discussed briefly in Section III of this paper.
The private implementation of digital preemption deserves further exploration.
II. The risks of digital preemption
Zittrain and others have written insightfully about the dangers of digital preemption.
Zittrain presents six types of objections to perfect enforcement preemption. 76 Following Zittrain, Christine Mulligan poses nine questions that should be asked to evaluate the use of technology to enforce a law. 77 While these analyses are excellent starting points, they are not the final word. First, Zittrain and Mulligan group digital preemption with other forms of technological enforcement, obscuring the unique issues posed by preemption.
Second, both authors paint with a very broad brush, discussing the risks of digital preemption generally without providing much guidance on how to assess these risks in particular situations.
Partly as a result of these gaps, readers may be prone to dismiss any proposed application of digital preemption as unjustifiably dangerous, notwithstanding that are more 75 See generally Loraine Mazerolle & Janet Ransley, Third Party Policing (2005). 76 The categories are: objections to the underlying substantive law, portability and enforceability without the rule of law, amplification and the lock-in of mistakes, bulwarks against the government, the benefits of tolerated uses, and the undesirable collapse of conduct and decision rules. Future, supra note 3, at 111-23. 77 See generally Mulligan, supra note 15.
nuanced. 78 This section presents a different and, I hope, more useful framework for thinking about the risks of digital preemption. It focuse on the dangers of that may accompany the use of digital preemption in place of traditional law enforcement techniques.
A. Overenforcement
As noted by Zittrain and others, one substantial risk of digital preemption is that preemptive techniques may apply the law inaccurately. 79 This is particularly likely when the law involves complex or subjective standards, exceptions, or defenses. 80 The key concern here is avoiding overenforcement, the preemption of conduct that is not in fact unlawful. 1. Which laws will be overenforced?
One might doubt that any law could be applied accurately by digital code. In fact, some prohibitions might be enforced by a digital algorithm with little risk of overenforcement.
Consider a typical drunk driving law, making it illegal for a person to drive when his or her blood alcohol level (BAC) exceeds 0.08. The law is easy to apply. To determine whether a person has violated the law, one needs only to know whether that person has a BAC over 0.08 and whether that person is driving. There are generally no exceptions to the law; drunk driving is always illegal. It is hard to imagine any plausible defense available to someone who has 78 See, e.g., Future, supra note 3, at 123 (concluding that there is a 79 -ussion of the public interest in free flow of information, driving is highly dangerous, 83 we might tolerate a small risk of overenforcement in order to save many lives. Thus, this law may be a good candidate for preemption.
However, many laws are too complex to apply through an algorithm, at least within current technical capabilities. These laws have complicated exceptions and defenses or involve subjective inquiries. Consider laws targeted at online obscenity. The examples above illustrate that overenforcement is more worrisome in some situations than others. To evaluate the risk in a particular situation, two questions should be asked. The first question is how frequently overenforcement would occur. The second question is how harmful overenforcement would be.
The answer to the first question will depend largely on the mechanics of the preemptive technique, but several general principles can help indicate whether a law might be enforced accurately through digital code. Preemption will likely make many mistakes in enforcing laws that require subjective, case-specific inquiries to determine liability, such as obscenity restrictions. Similarly, laws that often provoke the use of affirmative defenses like fair use or self-defense will be poor candidates for preemption. So too will laws that are designed to be enforced only at the discretion of a private party, like many copyright restrictions. For example, copyright restrictions under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) are enforced 95 To apply the law, the algorithm would have to check to see if the copyright holder wishes to issue a takedown notice. On the other hand, laws that can be stated as a straightforward rule with few exceptions, like drunk driving laws, might be enforceable through preemption with little overenforcement. 96 But this analysis is only the first step in assessing overenforcement. Lawmakers should also gauge the acceptability of overenforcement in the particular context at issue. In general, our legal system tolerates very little overenforcement. This is evidenced by the procedural and As an abstract matter, overenforcement through preemption might be be more tolerable than wrongful convictions for several reasons. First, criminal punishment is generally a more substantial penalty than the inability to engage in a particular course of conduct. Criminal punishment can carry significant stigma, and imprisonment, in particular, ability to do just anything at all. Second, overenforcement through digital preemption would be less likely to result from prejudice or corruption, since it would flow from a digital algorithm rather than human discretion. Third, wrongful preemption might be corrected relatively easily.
Software updates could fix systemic problems while an appeals process could correct specific mistakes and identify problems requiring larger updates. However, this is subject to the existence of an expedient system of review
We can find guidance in this difficult area by reference to the doctrine of preliminary injunctions. Preemptive systems function much like preliminary injunctions. They are like injunctions because they block a a person from engaging in a course of conduct. They are 97 See Dershowitz, supra note 11, at 232-33. 98 used in civil cases) to have attempted a nuclear attack or a release of smallpox preliminary because they take force through a brief assessment rather than a full hearing on the merits.
Preliminary injunctions are not awarded lightly, 99 largely due to the risk of false positives decisions to enjoin conduct that is not in fact unlawful. In a recent Supreme Court decision involving military sonar technology, 100 the Court held that preliminary injunctions are e injunction were not issued. 101 Furthermore, the party that will not be discussed here) and that the injunction would be in the public interest. 102 This doctrine is instructive in thinking about preemptive techniques.
In the context of preemption, the requirement of likely success on the merits would require preemption techniques to accurately identify unlawful conduct more often then they make mistakes. 103 The irreparable harm requirement would bar preemption except when the conduct at issue was dangerous and hard to redress through alternate law enforcement 99 extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right. In each case, courts must balance the competing claims of injury narks, citations omitted)). 100 impact statement. 101 Id. at 374. 102 Id.
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techniques. 104 Yet, the standard is not as high as it might be. For example, the doctrine does not require that the plaintiff show that they are nearly certain to prevail.
To see how these factors might guide analysis of a preemptive technique, suppose that someone has been prevented from driving by an ignition interlock system that accurately measures her Blood Alcohol Level to exceed 0.08. In almost every instance, if the person were danger to human life. Admittedly, if
we focus on a particular act of drunk driving, the act may not be likely to result in irreparable harm. On the other hand, when taken together, it is beyond question that the acts of drunk driving prevented by an ignition interlock mandate would otherwise result in a great deal of irreparable harm. Overall, it seems fair to say that the harm requirement is satisfied here.
Finally, under preliminary injunction doctrine, the court must assess the public interest.
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For example, in the military sonar case, the Court examined the negative consequences for the public of preventing military sonar experiments. 106 In the drunk driving example, the public interest might include the harm to the public from intrusion on liberty and benefit of reducing car accidents for public health and transportation.
In other contexts, the public interest requirement may caution against preemption. For example, this requirement would urge extreme caution when dealing with preemptive techniques that burden free speech. The constitutional bar on censorship is motivated at least as much by 104 Due to the nature of preemption, these inquiries would have to be undertaken generally, not in reference to any particular circumstances. Preemptive code would be implemented before particular situations occurred. 105 See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 364. 106 Id. at 378.
-expression. 107 And, in preemptive bars on speech are highly suspect.
B. Stasis
Preemption carries a second, somewhat more speculative risk: When preemption is used to enforce a law, the law may be immune from several traditional processes of change.
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Unlike traditional law enforcement, preemption does not require the participation of citizens, public officials, or judges. And without arrests or trials, preemption takes place largely in private. As a result, laws enforced through preemption be much less likely to encounter repeal or amendment as compared to laws enforced through traditional means.
Stasis will of course be troubling to anyone who believes that the substantive law is incorrect.
preemptive enforcement policy both because it is more effective than other enforcement methods and because, as a result of this effectiveness, the law will be less likely to change.
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Furthermore, regardless of the merits of a legal prohibition, stasis may be troubling in itself, especially in the circumstances described in the final part of this section.
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[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas 108 See, e.g., Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) . 109 This section is most closely ale. It removes a practical check on the use of ble Collapse of Conduct and 110 Zittrain opposes preemption of copyright laws for at least the first of these reasons. Future, supra note 3, at 111.
As a final preliminary note, the problem of stasis is not, in theory, unique to digital preemption. As I will show, the phenomenon can arise whenever a law is enforced through preemption so effectively as to nearly eliminate violations of the law across an entire jurisdiction.
111 However, non-digital methods of preemption have rarely achieved this level of effectiveness. This may be why stasis has not been explored in the criminology literature. Stasis demands our attention now due to the potentially overwhelming effectiveness of digital preemption.
The role of public officials and citizens in enforcement
Traditional law enforcement requires the participation of many people, including police, prosecutors, judges, and ordinary citizens. These people can change how law is applied or, in the case of judges, change the substantive law itself.
At several junctures in the traditional law enforcement model, police, prosecutors, and other public officials have an opportunity to shape how the law is applied. 112 Police and prosecutors exercise their discretion both in individual cases and through systematic policies.
For example, pursuant to an October 2009 memorandum, federal prosecutors will no longer prosecute people who use marijuana for medicinal purposes in 14 states where such use is not prohibited under state law. 113 The memorandum amounts to a change in federal law on marijuana use in these 14 states.
111 In fact, a tendency towards stasis might even arise from traditional deterrence if it is powerful enough to prevent nearly all violations. enforcement mechanism, 145 and the injury will be redressable through monetary damages or by altering the law or enforcement mechanism. 146 For example, someone who cannot access an allegedly obscene website due to a government filtering system will likely have standing to challenge the system in court.
It is true that such a person will have less incentive to challenge the law than a criminal defendant, since the defendant is faced with criminal punishment and the victim of wrongful preemption is not. Furthermore, the preemptive victim must bear a greater cost to challenge the law than the typical criminal defendant, who need not initiate a legal proceeding and can be represented cost-free by a public defender. The government might help alleviate these problems, however. For example, Congress could guarantee a set amount of monetary damages to anyone who prevails in a claim based on wrongful preemption. This would increase the incentive to bring legal challenges to wrongful preemption. It will also serve to discourage overenforcement, since the government would hesitate to implement inaccurate preemption.
Legal change through public debate
Finally, preemption does not require public arrests or trials. Indeed, when preemption is or she may be the interlock system, the event will take place largely in private. In contrast, when a person drives while intoxicated, the arrest and trial are often public events. 147 In general, preemption is more obscured from public view than traditional enforcement.
Public debate can be spurred by arrests and trials. In 2002, the editor and publisher of a free newspaper in Kansas City, Kansas were tried for criminal defamation, 148 a Class A misdemeanor punishable by up to a year in jail and a fine of $2,500. 149 The defendants, both disbarred lawyers, had falsely reported that the local mayor lived in a wealthy county to the south. Both were convicted. 150 The case spurred significant controversy and led legislators and the state officials 151 Such public controversy would have been less likely to arise if the publication of the false statements had been preempted. 147 In a Google News search for the week of Jan 6 driving cases and subject of ongoing research. Additionally, preemption may exacerbate the effects of status quo bias. It has been welldocumented that people generally prefer to continue the status quo, even when alternatives would provide greater utility. 155 In a world of preemption, the limits imposed by the government seem firmly entrenched in the environment and therefore may be accepted by both potential lawbreakers and observers rather than considered as objects of debate. For example, public opposition to Prohibition may have died quickly if alcohol consumption had been effectively preempted. In contrast, traditional law enforcement is disruptive. Offenders face disruption in their lives as they move through the criminal justice system. But others participate in trials or hear about them in the media, which may cause them to think critically about the law, at least occasionally.
Evaluating stasis
Like overenforcement, stasis will be more worrisome in some situations than in others.
They key inquiry is whether the substantive law is firmly entrenched or, instead, somewhat 152 Dershowitz, supra note 11, at 40-41. 153 Id. at 41. 154 Id at 41-42. Dershowitz notes that the preventive system was probably better understood in its own time. unsettled. A law can be classified as unsettled when there is significant disagreement among the public about the law or the norms that underlie it. For example, laws regulating pornography are unsettled because the public disagrees about the merit of these laws.
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Much of the law governing cyberspace seem unsettled. We can tell that internet law is in flux because the internet itself is a relatively new medium, because legislatures and agencies are busy revising rules for the internet, 157 and because people disagree vociferously about how cyberspace should be governed. 158 This means that there is reason to doubt whether current cyberspace rules are the right ones. Copyright law on the internet seems to be especially contentious. Responding to this uncertainty, Lawrence Lessig has issued 159 Lessig argues that we should rely on common law in this unsettled area 160 This sort of broad participation and gradual change is threatened by preemption.
The benefits of flexibility in the law are not limited to the internet. Legal scholars have argued persuasively that flexibility through common law leads to more efficient rules over 156 See, e. time. 161 Furthermore, flexibility allows the law to conform to changing social norms. For example, as norms about adultery have changed in the last hundred years, the law enforcement system has permitted and indeed, forced prosecutorial practice to change with them.
One might question whether such change is desirable. After all, if one is absolutely certain that a legal rule is correct, why should one embrace an enforcement model that might someday contribute to its repeal or amendment? Oliver Wendell Holmes and Ronald Dworkin have provided powerful answers. In his famous discussion on free speech and the marketplace of ideas, 162 Holmes 163 Yet, Holmes insists that we can never be so certain of our beliefs and must allow 164 The mechanisms of legal change discussed in this section are part of that market.
Dworkin applies this concept directly to law in the context of civil disobedience.
Dworkin argues including the Supreme Court, are sometimes wrong. 165 Even within short periods, courts have often realized that their previous decisions were legally or morally incorrect. 166 Furthermore, in the long run, change in social norms and legal rules has generally led to a more just society. As Finally, legislatures might go even further and prohibit private preemption. This propsect raises complex questions which cannot be addressed in this article. For now, it must suffice to say that legislatures should think carefully about whether such action is necessary in light of market pressures and whether the benefits of preemption would justify intrusion on the ability of companies to design products as they see fit.
IV. Conclusion
Oliver Wendell Holmes penned one of the most memorable phrases in American legal 178 But technology may yet alter the balance in law between logic and experience, as it has in other parts of our lives. Increasingly, for example, products are manufactured not by people guided by their experience but rather by machines, operating according to set logical algorithms. 
